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The Insurance Liability Crisis in New
York: Is Article 16 Our Saving Grace?
I. Introduction
No Risky Businesses Need Apply! This was the reality
many municipalities and businesses recently faced throughout
New York State and the nation in their search for affordable
liability insurance.' The years 1985 and 1986 marked the peak of
the insurance liability crisis,2 characterized by substantial in-
creases in municipal liability insurance premiums,3 dramatic in-
1. Church, Sorry, Your Policy is Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16; GOVERNOR'S
ADVISORY COMM'N ON LIAB. INS., REPORT ON INSURING OUR FUTURE 40-41 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter JONES COMM'N REPORT]. According to a survey conducted by the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in which 39 states participated,
the problems of general and functional availability experienced in New York are
similar to those experienced in other States. The most commonly identified prob-
lem lines [of coverage] in the reporting States are as follows (including citation of
[the] number of States reporting each type of difficulty): Day Care (32 States),
Asbestos Removal (15), Hazardous Waste Disposal (13), Government Entities
(29), Liquor Liability (26) .... Long-Haul Truckers (22).
Id. at 41.
The legislative history of Article 16 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules,
§§ 1600-1603 (McKinney Supp. 1988), indicates that "[d]ay care centers, not-for-profit
organizations, volunteer groups, businesses, governmental entities, housing and transit
authorities, professionals and others have experienced sudden and inexplicable cancella-
tions and non-renewals of their liability insurance policies with little, if any, notice."
1986 N.Y. Laws 220.
The liability insurance problems of New York mirror the national problem. Cotter,
Insurance Commission Releases Report, THE BULLETIN, April, 1986, at 2 (newsletter of
the New York State Insurance Department).
2. Cotter, supra note 1, at 1, 2; Church, supra note 1, at 16; JONES COMM'N REPORT,
supra note 1, at 40. See also, TORT POLICY WORKING GROuP, ATr'y GEN. COMM'N, CAUSES,
EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND
AFFORDABILITY 1-5 (1986).
3. Church, supra note 1, at 16. The following increases in insurance liability premi-
ums were experienced by New York counties in the year 1985: Cattaraugus County
356%; Onondaga County 394%; Ontario County 400%; and Wyoming County 553%. Li-
ability Ins.: Its Impact upon Local Gov'ts, Municipalities and School Dists., 1985:
Hearings Before the N.Y. State Senate Standing Comm'n on Ins., Educ., Local Gov't
and Cities 11 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Randi Triant, Ass't Director,
Ass'n of Counties).
Of 260 towns surveyed by the Association of Towns, over 163 had increases between
1
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creases in deductibles,' and a lack of available coverage for cer-
tain high risk activities. As a result, many communities were
forced to cut services to cover premiums, or in extreme cases,
were forced to go without insurance at all.6 The New York Leg-
islature noted that the lack of available and affordable liability
insurance "threaten[s] to undermine economic development and
the delivery of essential and necessary services to residents, con-
sumers and businesses throughout New York State."'
On July 30, 1986, Governor Mario Cuomo signed into law a
bill which had originated in response to the outcry by munici-
palities for affordable liability insurance.8 Section 6 of the bill is
codified as Article 16 of the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules.9 Article 16 reforms the doctrine of joint and several liabil-
1% and 100%, 42 had increases between 101% and 200%, 10 towns had increases be-
tween 201% and 300%, and 10 towns had increases of 301% or more. Id. at 17 (state-
ment of G. Jeffrey Haber, Exec. Sec'y, County Dist. Att'y). A school district in Oswego
County paid $2,900 for insurance in 1984. This premium was increased to $21,000 in
1985 and the coverage decreased from $5 million to $3 million. Id. at 29 (statement of
Louis Grumet, Exec. Dir., N.Y. St. Sch. Bds. Ass'n).
4. Even the City of Hartford, "the insurance capital of the world," had its liability
coverage slashed from $31 million to $4 million with a corresponding 20% rise in total
premiums. Church, supra note 1, at 17.
5. In 1985 it was very difficult, if not impossible, in New York to obtain insurance
liability coverage for environmental impairment, foster parents' liability, and public offi-
cials' liability. Hearings, supra note 3, at 11 (statement of Randi Triant, Ass't Dir., Ass'n
of Counties). The State Thruway Authority had a difficult time obtaining affordable in-
surance because road construction and road condition were such common sources of mu-
nicipal liability. Id. at 10; Church, supra note 1, at 16-26.
Pollution liability insurance was difficult to obtain because insurers had no accurate
way to measure the potential risk, and hence they steered clear of supplying coverage at
all rather than miscalculate. Hearings, supra note 3, at 64 (statement of James Corcoran,
St. Sup't of Ins.).
6. In 1985, state insurance carriers informed officials of Broome, Dutchess, and Sen-
eca counties that these counties would no longer be covered. Hearings, supra note 3, at
11 (statement of Randi Triant, Ass't Dir., Ass'n of Counties). New York City's Roosevelt
Island tram was closed when the insurance premium increased from $800,000 to almost
$9 million. It was later reopened under the City's self-insurance plan. Church, supra note
1, at 18.
7. 1986 N.Y. Laws 220, § 1.
8. Act of July 30, 1986, ch. 682. In the memorandum Governor Cuomo wrote accom-
panying his signing of the bill, he said "[the bill] is intended to alleviate for the New
York insurance consumer the problems of unaffordability and unavailability of commer-
cial risk, professional liability and public entity insurance." Governor's Memorandum on
Approval of ch. 682, N.Y. Laws (July 30, 1986), reprinted in [1986] N.Y. Laws 3182,
3183-84 (McKinney).
9. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. §§ 1600-1603 (McKinney Supp. 1988). The text of Article
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16 is as follows:
§1600. Definitions.
As used in this article the term "non-economic loss" includes but is not lim-
ited to pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of consortium or other damages for
non-economic loss.
§1601. Limited liability of persons jointly liable.
1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when a verdict or decision in
an action or claim for personal injury is determined in favor of a claimant in an
action involving two or more tortfeasors jointly liable or in a claim against the
state and the liability of a defendant is found to be fifty percent or less of the
total liability assigned to all persons liable, the liability of such defendant to the
claimant for non-economic loss shall not exceed that defendant's equitable share
determined in accordance with the relative culpability of each person causing or
contributing to the total liability for non-economic loss; provided, however that
the culpable conduct of any person not a party to the action shall not be consid-
ered in determining any equitable share herein if the claimant proves that with
due diligence he was unable to obtain jurisdiction over such person in said action
(or in a claim against the state, in a court of this state).
2. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect or impair any right of a
tortfeasor under section 15-108 of the general obligations law.
§1602. Application.
The limitations set forth in this article shall:
1. apply to any claim for contribution or indemnification, but shall not
include:
(a) a claim for indemnification if, prior to the accident or occurrence on which
the claim is based, the claimant and the tortfeasor had entered into a written
contract in which the tortfeasor had expressly agreed to indemnify the claimant
for the type of loss suffered; or
(b) a claim for indemnification by a public employee, including indemnifica-
tion pursuant to section fifty-k of the general municipal law or section seventeen
or eighteen of the public officers law.
2. not be construed to impair, alter, limit, modify, enlarge, abrogate or restrict
(i) the limitations set forth in section twenty-a of the court of claims act; (ii) any
immunity or right of indemnification available to or conferred upon any defendant
for any negligent or wrongful act or omission; (iii) any right on the part of any
defendant to plead and prove an affirmative defense as to culpable conduct attrib-
utable to a claimant or decedent which is claimed by such defendant in the dimi-
nution of damages in any action; and (iv) any liability arising by reason of a non-
delegable duty or by reason of the doctrine of respondeat superior.
3. not apply to administrative proceedings.
4. not apply to claims under the workers' compensation law or to a claim
against a defendant where such defendant has impleaded a third party against
whom the claimant is barred from asserting a cause of action because of the appli-
cability of the workers' compensation law, to the extent of the equitable share of
said third party.
5. not apply to actions requiring proof of intent.
6. not apply to any person held liable by reason of his use, operation, or own-
ership of a motor vehicle or motorcycle, as those terms are defined respectively in
sections three hundred eleven and one hundred twenty-five of the vehicle and
traffic law.
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ity' 0 by limiting a defendant's liability for noneconomic losses to
the defendant's percentage of actual fault, if he is liable for 50%
or less.11
7. not apply to any person held liable for causing claimant's injury by having
acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others.
8. not apply to any person held liable by reason of the applicability of article
ten of the labor law.
9. not apply to any person held liable for causing claimant's injury by having
unlawfully released into the environment a substance hazardous to public health,
safety or the environment, a substance acutely hazardous to public health, safety
or the environment of a hazardous waste, as defined in articles thirty-seven and
twenty-seven of the environmental conservation law and in violation of article sev-
enty-one of such law; provided, however, that nothing herein shall require that the
violation of said article by such person has resulted in a criminal conviction or
administrative adjudication of liability.
10. not apply to any person held liable in a product liability action where the
manufacturer of the product is not a party to the action and the claimant estab-
lishes by a preponderance of the evidence that jurisdiction over the manufacturer
could not with due diligence be obtained and that if the manufacturer were a
party to the action, liability for claimant's injury would have been imposed upon
said manufacturer by reason of the doctrine of strict liability, to the extent of the
equitable share of such manufacturer.
11. not apply to any parties found to have acted knowingly or intentionally,
and in concert, to cause the acts or failure upon which liability is based; provided,
however, that nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to create, impair, al-
ter, limit, modify, enlarge, abrogate, or restrict any theory of liability upon which
said parties may be held liable to the claimant.
§1603. Burdens of proof.
In any action or claim for damages for personal injury a party asserting that
the limitations of liability set forth in this article do not apply shall allege and
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the exemptions set
forth in section sixteen hundred two applies. A party asserting limited liability
pursuant to this article shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence its equitable share of the total liability.
10. Under the theory of joint and several liability, each defendant is accountable for
the entire amount of the judgment regardless of his individual share of fault with respect
to a co-defendant. W. PROSSER, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 475 (5th ed. 1984). See
infra text accompanying notes 121-124.
11. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 1601 (McKinney Supp. 1988). Section 1601 is not clear
as to whether plaintiff's negligence is to be considered when determining whether de-
fendant's share of the total negligence is 50% or less. This ambiguity could lead to vastly
different results. Consider the situation where P is 40% at fault, Dl is 40% at fault, and
D2 is 20% at fault. If P's share is included in determining whether Dl and D2 are less
than 50% liable, then both D1 and D2 have only several liability. On the other hand, if
P's share is excluded from the determination, then as between D1 and D2, D1 is 662/3 %
at fault and D2 is 33 3 % at fault. Thus, Dl is now jointly and severally liable for the
amount of the judgment against the defendants.
Although there are no cases to date which resolve this ambiguity, Professor David
Siegel, editor of the New York State Bar Association publication THE NEW YORK STATE
[Vol. 9:165
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Part II of this Comment outlines the development of tort
law in New York and the overwhelming effect of Dole v. Dow
Chemical Co.12 In Part III, conflicting theories on the factors
which led to the insurance liability crisis are examined. Also dis-
cussed are the harsh effects of the imposition of joint and sev-
eral liability on defendants who have a low percentage of fault
but who possess substantial assets. Recommendations addressed
to the insurance liability crisis, and the legislative response em-
bodied in Article 16, are presented in Part IV. Part V identifies
the roots of the insurance crisis as the proliferation of third-
party actions. This Part concludes that to the extent that the
dramatic increase in litigation costs due to an explosion of third-
party actions has contributed to higher insurance premiums, Ar-
ticle 16 offers only a partial solution. This Comment concludes
that Article 16, although not a complete remedy to the problems
which led to the insurance liability crisis, is much more than a
Band-Aid, and may be the best legislative compromise available
for a complex problem.
II. Background
A. The Historical Development of Tort Law in New York
1. Sovereign Immunity
Under common-law principles of tort liability, the sovereign
could do no wrong.1 s In the United States, where the sovereign
was replaced by a system of state and federal government, sover-
LAW DIGEST, believes that "had the Legislature considered the point, it would have ex-
cluded . . . [the plaintiff's] own share of fault from the joint versus joint and several
tabulation." D. Siegel, The New Law Partially Abolishing the Joint Liability Rule in
Tort Cases - Part II, N.Y. ST. L. DIG., Nov. 1986, at 1.
12. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
13. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 1033. "In its origin it goes back to very ancient
times, when the principle was recognized that it was necessarily a contradiction of the
sovereignty of any lord and especially of the king to allow him to be sued as of right in
his own courts." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 895A-J introductory note (1977).
'Besides the attribute of sovereignty, the law also ascribes to the king in his polit-
ical capacity absolute perfection. The king can do no wrong: ...
The king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of think-
ing wrong: he can never mean to do an improper thing: in him is no folly or
weakness.'
Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REv. 476,
479 (1953) (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *246) (emphasis in original).
19891
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eign immunity 4 applied to both governmental levels. 15
Sovereign immunity was the law of New York until 1929,
when it was abolished by the 1929 Court of Claims Act."6 In
1945, Bernadine v. City of New York, 7 interpreted the Court of
Claims Act as eliminating sovereign immunity for all political
subdivisions of the state.
At the time sovereign immunity existed, industry profited
from the common belief that the social benefit derived from the
production of goods outweighed any reason for burdening indus-
try with liability for injuries."8 Accordingly, the prevailing prin-
14. Traditional sovereign immunity as borrowed from the English common law pro-
tected the sovereign (and in the United States, the government) from legal action at all
levels. See W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 1033. Through case law, the principle of sover-
eign immunity in the United States was broadened to bar suit against the government
except where the government has specifically consented to be sued. Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
15. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 1033. A few exceptions to sovereign immunity
developed between 1887 and 1946. In 1887 the Tucker Act allowed suits against the gov-
ernment on contract claims in the Court of Claims. 24 Stat. 505 (1887). The Act is cur-
rently found at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 507 (1968), 1346, 1402 (1976 & Supp. 1988), 1491, 1496,
1497, 1501, 1503 (1973 & Supp. 1988), 2071 (1982 & Supp. 1988), 2411 (1978 & Supp.
1988), 2501, 2512 (1965 & Supp. 1988). Also, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment allowed citizens to obtain just compensation from the government if they could
show that the government committed a taking of their property, or that the citizen fell
into one of the narrow statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity, or that such relief
was warranted under a private bill in Congress. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 1033. In
1946 Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act. 60 Stat. 843 (1946). The current
provisions are located at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 1402 (1976 & Supp. 1988), 2401 (1978 &
Supp. 1988), 2402 (1978), 2411, 2412 (1978 & Supp. 1988), 2671, 2672 (1965 & Supp.
1988), 2674 (1965), 2675 (1965 & Supp. 1988), 2676 (1965), 2677, 2678, 2679, 2680 (1965
& Supp. 1988). W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 1034.
16. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963).
17. Bernadine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945). In Bern-
adine, the plaintiff sued the City of New York for injuries caused by a runaway police
horse. The court held that the civil divisions of the state do not have any independent
sovereignty. Therefore, the waiver of sovereign immunity by the State also waived immu-
nity for the civil divisions of the State. Id. at 365, 62 N.E.2d at 605.
18. JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 122. According to the noted Judge Oliver
Wendell Holmes,
[a] man need not.., do this or that act ... but he must act somehow. Further-
more, the public generally profits by individual activity. As action cannot be
avoided, and tends to the public good, there is obviously no policy in throwing the
hazard of what is at once desirable and inevitable upon the actor.
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 95 (1881). This doctrine was restated as follows: "To hold
that a person does every voluntary act at his peril, and must insure others against all of
the consequences that may occur would, in most instances, be an intolerably heavy bur-
den upon human activity." W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 163 (citing 0. HOLMES, THE
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss1/5
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ciple of the time was "loss from accident must lie where it
falls,"' unless the loss is the result of activity unreasonably haz-
ardous to others.20 Not surprisingly, the term "unreasonably
hazardous" was construed quite narrowly.2
Limits to recovery also existed on the defendant's side. Un-
til 1972, a defendant's ability to seek contribution from other
tortfeasors turned on the active-passive negligence distinction.22
2. The Active-Passive Negligence Distinction
Under the active-passive negligence rule, a defendant found
to be 'actively' negligent was not allowed to implead a third-
party defendant.23 Thus, the active-passive distinction served to
limit the number of third-party defendants who could be
impleaded.24
In the landmark case of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 25 the
New York Court of Appeals abolished the distinction between
active and passive tortfeasors2 6 In Dole, the plaintiff's husband
inhaled a fumigant used by his employer and subsequently died,
allegedly as a result of inhaling the fumes. The plaintiff sued the
manufacturer of the fumigant for failing to properly label the
fumigant with a warning of its dangerous nature. The manufac-
turer impleaded the employer alleging that the product had
been adequately labeled and that it was the employer's failure to
COMMON LAW 93-96 (1881)).
19. 0. HOLMES, supra note 18, at 94. "All the cases concede that an injury arising
from inevitable accident, or... from an act that ordinary human care and foresight are
unable to guard against, is but the misfortune of the sufferer, and lays no foundation for
legal responsibility." Id. at 95 (quoting Harvey v. Dunlop, Hill & Den. 193 (1843)).
20. JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 122. "Unless my act is of a nature to
threaten others . 0..." 0. HOLMES, supra note 18, at 96.
21. JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 122.
22. D. Siegel, NEw YORK PRACTICE 211 (1978). A defendant's impleader right was
controlled by a plaintiff's complaint. "The impleader was allowed if [a plaintiff] alleged
'passive' conduct by [a defendant] but precluded if [a plaintiff] pleaded 'active' behav-
ior." Id. at 210 n.5 (quoting Kennedy v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 282 A.D. 1001, 125
N.Y.S.2d 552 (4th Dep't 1953), aff'd, 307 N.Y. 875, 122 N.E.2d 753 (1954)).
23. D. SIEGEL, supra note 22, at 211.
24. Id.
25. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
26. Id. at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 291-92, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387; D. SIEGEL, supra note
22, at 211. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 3019, commentary at 49 (McKinney 1987). The
principles enunciated in Dole were codified in N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 1401-1404 (Mc-
Kinney 1987).
19891
7
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:165
defumigate the area that caused decedent's death.2 7 Had the ac-
tive-passive distinction been applied in Dole, Dow "would have
been precluded [from impleading the employer because Dow]
was accused of ... labeling and circulating a poison product,
which would have qualified as 'active' negligence. 2 8 Instead, the
Dole court allowed the use of the impleader device by an 'active'
tortfeasor, thereby abandoning the active-passive distinction.29
By eliminating the active-passive classification entirely, an
active or passive defendant can implead both an active or pas-
sive third-party defendant.30 In other words, after Dole, many
more parties can be brought into a suit.
Another direct result of the Dole decision was to eliminate
one of the few remaining barriers to a plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion.3 In addition to sovereign immunity and the active-passive
distinction, the contributory negligence rule was a formidable re-
striction on tort actions in early tort history.
3. Contributory Negligence Replaced By Comparative
Negligence
The contributory negligence rule barred a plaintiff from re-
covering from a defendant where the plaintiff himself contrib-
uted in any way to the injury.32 In 1975, New York joined the
27. Dole, 30 N.Y.2d at 143, 282 N.E.2d at 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
28. D. SIEGEL, supra note 22, at 211.
29. Id.
30. Dole created a right of contribution from passive tortfeasors. Id. at 212.
The widow could not sue [the employer] directly because as against ... the em-
ployer, workmen's compensation was the exclusive remedy. WORKMEN'S COMP. L. §
11. But when suit by or in behalf of the employee is brought against some other
person liable for the tort, the latter may turn around and implead the employer.
The theory is that such a claim is one for indemnity, not for tort, and is therefore
not precluded by the exclusivity of the workmen's compensation remedy. Dole is a
classic illustration of this phenomenon in New York, which subjects the employer
indirectly (via having to make good as a third-party defendant) to the full mea-
sure of common law tort liability for which suit by the employee could not be
brought against the employer directly.
Id. at 211 n.4.
31. N.Y. CiV. PRAC. L. & R. § 3019, commentary at 56 (McKinney 1974); D. SIEGEL,
supra note 22, at 212.
32. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 451-52. "Contributory negligence is conduct on
the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection." Id.
at 451 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1979)). In the United States,
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss1/5
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majority of the states in replacing the rule of contributory negli-
gence with that of comparative negligence. 8 The Dole decision
has been credited with accelerating this changeover in that it
established, by judicial fiat, comparative negligence among
tortfeasors3 4
Pursuant to the comparative negligence rule, the jury deter-
mines the percentage of fault attributable to each party. The
plaintiff can recover from the defendants for the amount of the
injury, less the percentage of his own contributory negligence. 35
If there are multiple defendants, they are each liable to the
plaintiff for their respective shares of fault."
This change removed the disincentive for plaintiffs to sue defend-
ants who might be assigned minor shares of fault. Indeed, in cases
where the primary defendant is without assets or judgment-proof,
the rule of comparative negligence combines with the rule of joint
and several liability to exert a powerful incentive to include low-
fault defendants in the lawsuit as the plaintiff's only practical
hope for recovering any substantial compensation."7
Thus, adoption of the comparative negligence rule provides the
motive and the opportunity to bring in as many third-party de-
fendants as possible, resulting in a surge of third-party
litigation.3 8
contributory negligence has been a bar to plaintiffs' suits since 1824. Smith v. Smith, 19
Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824).
33. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 1411 (McKinney 1987); JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra
note 1, at 130. By 1979, 32 states had adopted comparative negligence. Gordon & Crow-
ley, Indemnity Issues in Settlement of Multiparty Actions in Comparative Negligence
Jurisdictions, 48 INS. COUNSEL J. 457, 458 (1981).
34. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 3019, commentary at 56 (McKinney 1974); D. SIEGEL,
supra note 22, at 212. "It is generally acknowledged that Dole is very much a doctrine of
comparative negligence restricted to the sphere of the tortfeasors' rights inter se." N.Y.
CIv. PRAC. L & R. § 3019, commentary at 56 (McKinney 1974).
35. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 1411 (McKinney 1976); W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at
472.
36. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. § 1411 (McKinney 1976); W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at
472.
37. JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 130.
38. Because the majority of states adopted a comparative negligence rule in the
1970's, a surge of third-party litigation occurred not only in New York, but nationwide.
JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 130-31; Gordon & Crowley, supra note 33, at
457, 458 (1981).
19891
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4. The Post-Dole Megacase
Brennan v. Nelicks Furniture and Craftmaster Furniture 3
is a classic example of the post-Dole third-party action phenom-
enon. In Brennan, the plaintiff purchased a couch from the de-
fendant retailer.4 ° The plaintiff suffered severe burns when a
lighted cigarette burned through the plastic covering to the cot-
ton batting, which ignited the polyurethane filling of the
couch."' Although the plastic covering itself was not flammable,
it melted, allowing the cigarette to reach the cotton batting and
the highly flammable polyurethane.' 2 The batting had been
treated with an oil-base dust suppressant which probably sus-
tained the burning of the batting and allowed it to reach the
polyurethane.'
The plaintiff sued the retailer and the manufacturer of the
couch. Defendant Craftmaster brought a third-party action
against Hickory Springs, Inc., the supplier of the polyurethane
filling, Quaker Fabrics, the manufacturer of the plastic uphol-
stery covering on the sofa, and William Burnett Co., the manu-
facturer of the cotton batting used as filling in the sofa." Prior
to Dole, it is doubtful that the defendant Craftmaster could
have brought a third-party action against any of the suppliers
since Craftmaster was "actively" negligent 3 in combining the
components of the couch in such a way as to make them danger-
ous.' 6 Clearly, the defendant Craftmaster had a strong incentive
to bring in as many third parties as it could in an effort to di-
minish its own share of fault. 7 Thus, an action that would have
involved three parties pre-Dole, involved six parties post-Dole.
Another example of this phenomenon is Clickner v.
Shanley."' In that case, the plaintiff passenger was injured in a
39. No. 5339-81 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Albany County 1987).
40. Id. Telephone interview with Alfred Purello, Esq., attorney for the plaintiff (Feb.
16, 1988) [hereinafter Purello interview].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 23-30.
46. Purello interview, supra note 40.
47. Id.
48. No. 144540 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County Feb. 16, 1988).
[Vol. 9:165
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car accident in the City of Troy and taken to a local hospital.49
The plaintiff sued the driver of the other car for negligence, and
the hospital and the orthopedic surgeon for malpractice.50 Later,
the plaintiff was barred by the statute of limitations from join-
ing the City or the anesthesiologist as defendants.5 1 However,
because the statute of limitations did not bar a defendant from
bringing in third parties, the City of Troy and the anesthesiolo-
gist were brought in by the defendant.52 Before Dole, neither the
City nor the anesthesiologist, as alleged "passive" wrongdoers,
could have been joined by the defendant." Again, where there
would have been only four parties pre-Dole, there were now six.
This post-Dole ability to join numerous third parties has oc-
curred, however, at a cost.
B. Symptoms of Insurance Unavailability and Unaf-
fordability Begin
Six years after the comparative negligence rule became the
second of the Dole tort reforms to be codified,"' insurance pre-
miums began to rise dramatically. The premium increases be-
tween 1981 and 198555 resulted in the emergence of two unique
problems throughout the State. The first was the general un-
availability of insurance, which has been defined as "the total
inability of an enterprise or local government that desires cover-
age to obtain any insurance at any price." 58 The second was the
functional unavailability of insurance, which is defined as:
either the exclusion from coverage of certain activities of the in-
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. Impleader is permissible after the defendant has served his answer in the
primary action and "is not subject to any other specific time limit. While laches may be a
defense to the impleader, in most cases it is a defense only to the plaintiff and not to the
third-party defendant." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 1007, commentary at 10 (McKinney
1976).
52. Clickner v. Shanley, No. 144540 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County Feb. 16, 1988).
53. Id. Prior to Dole, an "active" defendant could not implead a third party until a
judgment had been rendered against the defendant. Then, an action for indemnification
could be brought. D. SIEGEL, supra note 22, at 211.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 23-30 for a discussion of the first Dole tort
reform codification, the elimination of the active-passive negligence distinction.
55. COTrER, supra note 1, at 2.
56. JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
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sured that are perceived as high risk, without the option to elimi-
nate the exclusion in return for a price override; or the inability
of the insured to obtain at any price coverage affording the higher
policy limits that the insured considers necessary and prudent.57
General unavailability is less prevalent than functional un-
availability, but has more severe consequences.5 8 To counter the
problem of general unavailability, the State Department of In-
surance established the Market Assistance Program (MAP) to
"assist municipalities and other public entities that have been
unable to secure insurance in the voluntary insurance market-
place."'5 9 Realizing that a community without liability insurance
exposes itself to the possibility of catastrophic financial indebt-
edness, 164 municipalities opted to apply for MAP assistance by
April 1, 1986.60
Functional unavailability, on the other hand, has been an
even greater problem for municipalities because it is more wide-
spread. 1 In New York, pollution-producing activities, recrea-
tional activities, certain types of mass transportation, child care
centers, and liquor purveyors represent the most common areas
for which insurance has been functionally unavailable.2
In January 1986, in response to the alarm over the dwin-
dling availability and escalating cost of insurance, Governor
Cuomo established the Governor's Advisory Commission on Lia-
bility Insurance" to investigate the problem and recommend a
solution." Because a crisis existed which demanded an immedi-
ate remedy, the legislative course was accelerated. Just four
months after the Jones Commission was formed, it produced its
findings and recommendations. A bill was drafted in June based
on the recommendations of the Jones Commission, signed by the
Governor on June 28, 1986, and became effective on July 30,
57. Id. at 23.
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id. at 25 n.1.
60. Id. at 26.
61. Id. at 6.
62. Id. at 23-24.
63. Known as the Jones Commission, see supra note 1.
64. JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 1; Governor's Memorandum on Approval
of ch. 682, N.Y. Laws (July 30, 1986), reprinted in [1986] N.Y. Laws 3182, 3183-84
(McKinney).
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1986.65 In short order, Article 16 was added to the Civil Practice
Law and Rules, making sweeping changes in the application of
joint and several liability in New York. Article 16 was drafted
based on what the Jones Commission identified as the causes of
the insurance liability crisis. Since misidentification of the
causes would inevitably result in an inappropriate solution, it is
necessary to examine the roots of the problem before predicting
whether Article 16 is a proper remedy.
III. Factors Behind the Insurance Crisis
Because the Jones Commission membership was composed
of many insurance industry representatives," its findings have
been challenged by those who felt the Commission's membership
was biased.67 In its report, the Jones Commission found two pri-
mary causes for the insurance crisis: First, a "long-term surge in
the costs arising from civil liability"68 and second, the insurance
business cycle. 9
65. See Act of July 30, 1986, ch. 682.
66. The Jones Commission was composed of the following representatives:
3 insurance industry executives;
4 insurance defense or corporate attorneys;
3 representatives of municipal entities;
1 representative of the NYS medical society;
1 representative of professional insurance agents;
1 representative of an insurance brokerage firm;
1 media consultant for a firm which has worked for tort [r]eform;
2 judges;
2 consumer advocates; and
2 representatives of minority organizations.
Pazer, Insurance Study Commission Flawed by Its Membership, N.Y.L.J., July 14, 1986,
at 21, col. 1.
67. ALLIANCE FOR CONSUMER RIGHTS, 1987 BRIEFING BOOK 6 [hereinafter ALLIANCE].
The Alliance for Consumer Rights (ACR) was the primary lobbying group opposing the
Jones Commission's findings and proposals. ACR represented the interests of the New
York State Trial Lawyers Association, and received support in its lobbying efforts from
the Environmental Planning Lobby (EPL), the Brooklyn Fifth Avenue Committee, the
St. Nicholas Development Corporation, the Citizen Action of New York (formerly New
York Community Action Network), and the AFL-CIO. Id. at 6-8.
68. JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 45 (emphasis omitted).
69. Id. at 45. The insurance business cycle is the "erratic but . . . repetitive orbit
revolving around the relative profitability of underwriting and investment activities and
the worldwide ebb and flow of capital into and out of insurance." Id.
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A. Is There a Long-term Surge in the Costs Arising from Civil
Liability?
The Jones Commission reported that "the frequency of ac-
cidents generating claims approximately doubled over the past
five years, [and] the number of claims valued by the insurer at
more than $100,000 grew much more rapidly."7 The Jones Com-
mission concluded that "[i]t is the growth of a relatively small
minority of larger claims, and the upward pressure that this has
exerted on [the] average claim value, that has generated most of
the cost surge.'71
1. Are Jury Awards on the Rise?
According to the Jones Commission, the reason for the in-
creased claim values is "an upward revaluation of societal con-
cepts of the dollar value of intangible injury, '72 a phenomenon
linked to the presence of a jury.73 The Attorneys General from
six states, however, who had formed an ad hoc committee 74 to
address the problem of nationwide skyrocketing premiums, dis-
agreed sharply with the idea that jury verdicts have increased
dramatically.75 Their study concluded that "[tihe 'large' verdict
is ... the means used by proponents of changes in tort law to
suggest that victims are being overcompensated, and has become
the target of many proposed tort law changes."7 "
The Jones Commission reported that between 1977 and
1985, "[t]he dollar value of the average personal injury settle-
ment [in New York City]"' had risen from $7,127 to $31,740...
70. Id. at 13.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 83.
73. Id. at 84.
74. Known as the Ad Hoc Committee on Insurance Availability of the National As-
sociation of Attorneys General.
75. An Analysis of the Causes of the Current Crisis of Unavailability and Unaf-
fordability of Liability Insurance, [1986] Arr'Ys GEN. REP., reprinted in N.Y. ST. TRIAL
LAw. Ass'N, 1987 BRIEFING BOOK 31 [hereinafter BRIEFING BOOK]. The ad hoc committee
was composed of the Attorneys General from Massachusetts, California, North Carolina,
Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The Committee prepared a report on the insurance
liability crisis for the National Association of Attorneys General.
76. Id. at 32.
77. Because the Jones Commission found that poor business practices partially con-
tributed to the crisis, the Commission focused on data from the City of New York. The
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an increase of 345% .''7 These figures reported by the Jones
Commission, however, are deceptive because the changing value
of the dollar was not taken into account.79 Using a constant dol-
lar value, Gustav Shubert of the Rand Corporation Institute of
Civil Justice, found that "the median jury verdict has remained
at approximately $8,000 in 1979 dollars since 1959."0S The Rand
Corporation is not alone in this finding. The New York Office of
the Comptroller concurs in these findings, noting that:
[s]ince 1981, the amount of money the City of New York spends
on personal injury cases has declined in both constant dollars and
as a percentage of the City's budget. The amount the City spent
on personal injury cases was 0.75% of the 1981 budget, and only
0.63% of the 1985 budget.81
The explanation for the figures presented by the insurance
industry showing increasing jury awards is found in the limited
scope of their data. Jury Verdicts Research (JVR) of Solon,
Ohio, which provides the insurance industry with much of its
data, has only painted half the picture.82 The JVR results are
misleading because they do not take into account such signifi-
cant factors as inflation, settlements, verdicts lowered on ap-
peal,8 3 bench verdicts, verdicts for defendants, or verdicts in-
City of New York is self-insured and would not be subject to the insurance industry's
poor business cycle. JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 35-39.
78. Id. at 38.
79. ALLIANCE, supra note 67, at 21.
80. Id.
A strong argument can be made that little evidence has been offered which dem-
onstrates a significant increase in the number of claims or lawsuits, or in the aver-
age size of payment [of] bodily injury claims. The 1983 Rand study concludes 'not
only that reports of a product liability 'crisis' in the mid-1970s were exaggerated,
but that.., it has become evident that product liability claims have not been an
unreasonable cost to most manufacturers.
Kindregan & Swartz, The Assault on the Captive Consumer: Emasculating the Com-
mon Law of Torts in the Name of Reform, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 673, 709 (1987) (quoting
THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE RAND CORP., DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPO-
RATE RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION 121 (1983) as cited in S.
REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1984)).
81. ALLIANCE, supra note 67, at 21.
82. BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 75, at 11.
83. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348
(1981) ("exploding Pinto" case in which punitive damages award lowered from $125 mil-
lion to $3.5 million).
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volving no money.8 4
Furthermore, in order to determine a typical jury award,
one must calculate the median and not the average award. 5 Be-
cause a median is the midpoint of all the awards, it reflects the
maximum amount awarded in at least half of the cases. Since an
average could be skewed by a few large awards, the median typi-
cally would be significantly smaller.8 6 To illustrate, the average
award for reported verdicts in Cook County, Illinois, in 1983 was
$137,350, whereas the median award was only $8,800.87 A full
87.7% of the awards were lower than the average. 8 Moreover, if
higher jury awards actually were the reason for the increase in
premiums, logic would dictate that enactment of legislation
which sets caps on those awards should cause premiums to re-
turn to precrisis levels. However, "in repeated testimony, the in-
surance industry representatives refused to guarantee reduced
premiums" even in exchange for caps on claim values.8 "
2. Is Increased Litigation a Factor?
Allegations by the insurance industry that runaway civil liti-
gation has led to the long-term surge in the cost of civil litiga-
tion are also in dispute. The insurance industry claimed that as
a result of a flood of tort litigation, they suffered losses in 1984
of $20.5 billion. 0 The General Accounting Office figures for
1984, however, indicate that industry's capital gains realized in
that year exceeded losses by $300 million, actually giving the in-
dustry a net gain for that year.9' In 1985 the industry reported a
84. BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 75, at 11.
85. Id. at 31 (discussing DANIELS, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STORM ON THE HORIZON?
PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES PROJECT 13 (prepared for delivery at the
American Bar Foundation Fellows Seminar, February 8, 1986)).
86. BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 75, at 31.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. ALLIANCE, supra note 67, at 5-6.
90. Kindregan & Swartz, supra note 80, at 710. These loss figures provided by the
insurance industry were used by the Jones Commission in making its report. BRIEFING
BOOK, supra note 75, at 42.
91. Kindregan & Swartz, supra note 80, at 710; ALLIANCE, supra note 67, at 32.
These are the figures that have been recorded for the industry by the U.S. General Ac-
counting Office.
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net after-tax profit of $1.7 billion.2 Moreover, within the first
quarter of 1986, income from investments had already exceeded
losses by $474 million. 8
Most importantly, the "losses" cited by the insurance indus-
try as justification for premium increases do not represent actual
money paid out to claimants.9 Rather, they represent the
amount of funds put into reserve to meet projected future
claims. 5 Actually, with the exception of 1974, insurance com-
pany assets have increased every year between 1955 and 1985.96
Such growth does not support the insurance industry's conten-
tion that it is being drained by our increasingly litigious
society. 7
Although courts suffer a backlog of cases on their calen-
dars," the Jones Commission concluded that the primary in-
crease of cases in most jurisdictions is in the area of criminal
and family matters, not tort claims.99 A study by the National
Center for State Courts found that between 1981 and 1984, the
number of state court civil filings actually decreased by 4%."'e
In addition, they determined that over a six-year period there
was only a 9% increase in tort claims nationwide, which paral-
lels the 8% increase in population for that period.101 Therefore,
92. ALLIANCE, supra note 67, at 32.
93. Kindregan & Swartz, supra note 80, at 711.
94. Id. at 710-11.
95. Id. at 711; ALLIANCE, supra note 67, at 22. This type of accounting allows the
industry to avoid paying income taxes on the premiums received by offsetting them
against expected future losses. In recognition of the need to close this loophole, Congress
passed legislation forcing the insurance industry to change its system of accounting. Id.
at 22-23.
96. Kindregan & Swartz, supra note 80, at 710. The industry has been accused of
engaging in "voodoo accounting," based on claims that "if adjustments are made for
some quirks in insurance accounting (primarily involving the treatment of taxes, divi-
dends and the rising paper value of investments), the industry made a net profit every
year." Church, supra note 1, at 25.
97. Kindregan & Swartz, supra note 80, at 710.
98. JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 84.
99. Id. While this may not be the situation in every jurisdiction, the Jones Commis-
sion found it to be generally the case in the majority of jurisdictions. See also Galanter,
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We
Know) About our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4
(1983).
100. BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 75, at 8-9.
101. Id. at 9.
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increased litigation does not seem to have been a significant fac-
tor in the insurance crisis.
3. Did the Elimination of Contributory Negligence Signif-
icantly Impact the Costs of Providing Liability Coverage?
The Jones Commission and Eugene Borenstein, Deputy
Chief of the New York City Law Department Tort Division,
have cited to the elimination of the contributory negligence rule
as a major factor in the increased cost of municipal liability cov-
erage. 102 After Dole, and the enactment of the comparative neg-
ligence rule, 03 a plaintiff, despite any contributory negligence of
his own, can recover a money judgment where he previously
would have been completely barred.
Logically speaking, it would seem that creating an avenue
for recovering a judgment in tort where none previously existed
would increase insurance payouts and cause higher premiums.
Elimination of the contributory negligence rule, however, did
not make as much of a difference in a plaintiff's ability to re-
cover as the Jones Commission and others claim.' 0 ' The contrib-
utory negligence rule was only a bar to recovery in so far as the
jury wanted it to be.'05 In other words, juries sympathizing with
an injured plaintiff were unlikely to deny a plaintiff any recovery
whatsoever where the plaintiff contributed only minimally to the
injury. 0 6 For example, a plaintiff wearing high heels or neglect-
ing to wear prescription glasses might easily have contributed to
his or her fall on a sidewalk.10 7 While technically, these activities
102. Interview with Eugene Borenstein, Deputy Chief of the Tort Division of the
New York City Law Department, in New York City (Jan. 27, 1988) [hereinafter Boren-
stein interview]; JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 123, 130.
103. After the 1972 Dole decision, and even before the enactment of the comparative
negligence rule in 1975, many of the lower New York courts abandoned contributory
negligence in favor of comparative negligence. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 3019, commen-
tary at 270-73 (McKinney 1974).
104. Interview with Judge Edward S. Conway, Administrative Judge for the Third
Judicial District of New York, in Albany, New York (Feb. 1, 1988) [hereinafter Conway
interview]. Judge Conway has served as a judge for 22 years, since 1967.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. According to Eugene Borenstein, because of the possibility that the lack of pre-
scription glasses or the use of high heels could contribute to an injury, no plaintiffs in the
history of litigation against the City of New York ever wore high heels or were without
the aid of their prescription glasses. Borenstein interview, supra note 102.
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could be a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery under the con-
tributory negligence rule, it was highly unlikely that any jury
would bar plaintiff's recovery on the basis of such commonplace
behavior. 10 8 Furthermore, the judge himself would not make a
strong jury charge of contributory negligence in this situation.109
B. The Insurance Business Cycle Leads to Bad Business Prac-
tices on the Part of the Insurance Industry
It is generally accepted, even by the insurance industry it-
self, that certain practices of the industry are to blame for con-
tributing significantly to the increasing cost of coverage." 0 The
insurance industry business cycle is one which "revolv[es]
around the relative profitability of underwriting and investment
activities and the worldwide ebb and flow of capital into and out
of insurance.""' As a result of this cycle, the insurance industry
engages in the practice of cash-flow underwriting when interest
rates are high. 1 2 A United States Senate study found that this
"practice of 'cash flow underwriting"'. was linked directly to the
•..crisis."""
The practice of cash-flow underwriting began at the time of
the unprecedented rise in interest rates during the late 1970's
and early 1980's."3 In an effort to obtain as many premium dol-
lars as the industry could for its investment portfolios, the in-
108. Conway interview, supra note 104.
109. Id.
110. Hearings, supra note 3, at 56-57 (statement of James P. Corcoran, N.Y. St.
Sup't. of Ins.); JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 68-69.
111. JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 45.
112. Id.
113. Cash-flow underwriting involves writing business at a loss in the anticipation
that "the investment income will offset the losses and result in a bottom line profit."
Hearings, supra note 3, at 132-33. Cash-flow underwriting occurs
[wihen interest rates and investment income are high, as they were during the
early 1980s, [and] insurers . . . use that income to subsidize underwriting opera-
tions in order to maximize the cash that those operations generate for investment
.... When disinflation reduced interest rates, however, the investment subsidy
disappeared and the underwriting losses began to take their toll.
JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-11.
114. Kindregan & Swartz, supra note 80, at 711 (quoting S. REP. No. 294, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986)).
115. JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 67-69; ALLIANCE, supra note 67, at 22;
BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 75, at 11.
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dustry engaged in a price war. " ' Not only did it sell insurance
policies to poor business risks, it also sold policies at too low a
premium.1 ' Furthermore, carriers were reluctant to be the first
to raise prices when it became prudent to do so."' As the Jones
Commission noted: "[A]lthough the behavior of the industry can
be understood, it can hardly be described as prudent. Society
has every right to expect a higher standard of judgment from a
corporate sector to which it has entrusted a function as vital as
property/casualty insurance.""
A recognition of the consequences to the insurance con-
sumer of these insurance practices has resulted in extensive
changes to the insurance regulations regarding cash-flow under-
writing. 120 These poor business practices, however, were only
partially responsible for the insurance liability crisis. The appli-
cation of the theory of joint and several liability to deep pocket
defendants has played a significant role in contributing to the
emergency as well.
C. Joint and Several Liability - The Root of Deep Pocket
Trauma?
Under the theory of joint and several liability, each defend-
ant in a multidefendant suit is accountable for the entire
amount of the judgment, regardless of his individual share of
fault. '2 For example, one defendant can be forced to pay an en-
tire judgment, regardless of his proportionate share of fault,
where a co-defendant is insolvent. 22 This has become known as
the "deep pocket" theory of liability. 23 Municipalities, in partic-
ular, have been plagued by the harsh financial reality of joint
116. JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 68; ALLIANCE, supra note 67, at 22.
117. ALLIANCE, supra note 67, at 22; BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 75, at 11. For exam-
ple, retroactive insurance was given to the MGM Grand Hotels, Inc. after its Las Vegas
hotel fire in 1980. ALLIANCE, supra note 67, at 22.
118. JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 68-69.
119. Id. at 69.
120. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 162 (1987).
121. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 475.
122. Id. "[Tihe defendant who pays has the right to require, and if necessary to sue
to compel, other defendants to reimburse him/her in shares equal to their respective
shares of adjudged fault." JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 129.
123. "The low-fault/high-pay dynamic has come to be known as the 'deep pocket'
phenomenon." JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 131.
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and several liability.1"' The imposition of joint and several liabil-
ity is especially severe when a defendant's share of the fault is
very small.
For example, in New York, which only requires drivers to
carry $10,000 of personal liability insurance on their motor vehi-
cles,1"" one can easily see how the imposition of joint and several
liability could hold a public-entity defendant responsible for
paying that part of the judgment in excess of the $10,000.12 Ex-
amples of this manifest unfairness abound.
A driver on Staten Island fell asleep and collided with the
rear of a vehicle owned by the City of New York. A female pas-
senger brought suit against the driver and the City for injuries
which left her a quadriplegic. A jury awarded her $4.2 million.
The City was found 15% liable because its vehicle was being
driven too slowly as opposed to the sleeping driver who was
found 85% liable. Since the driver was insured for only $50,000,
the City was liable for its own $650,000 share plus the sleeping
driver's $3.53 million share.1" 7
In Gonzalez v. City of New York, 128 another deep pocket
municipal liability case, plaintiff was hit by a car while standing
on an icy roadway behind an illegally parked car. He was pinned
between the illegally parked car and another, resulting in severe
injury requiring the surgical amputation of his legs above the
knees.12' The jury found that the plaintiff was not at fault and
awarded him $2,125,000 in damages.13 0 The trial judge set aside
the verdict, stating that the jury's finding was beyond the weight
124. Id. at 130; N.Y. ST. COALITION FOR MUN. TORT LIAR. AND INS. REFORM, TEN POINT
MUN. TORT LIAB. AND INS. REFORM PLAN, (Oct. 15, 1985), reprinted in Hearings, supra
note 3, at appendix. The coalition is composed of the following members: The Confer-
ence of Mayors and Municipal Officials; the Association of Counties; the Association of
Towns; the School Boards Association; the City of New York; and the Independent In-
surance Agents Association of New York, Inc.
125. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 311(4)(a) (McKinney 1986). The minimum coverage
required by law for personal injury liability is only $10,000 per person, and $20,000 per
occurrence.
126. Borenstein interview, supra note 102.
127. Torain, State's Local Governments Seek Cap Of Damage Suits, Canandaiga
Daily Messenger, Mar. 21, 1985, at 14, col. 1.
128. Gonzalez v. City of New York, No. 2730s (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't Oct. 14,
1986).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1, 2.
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of the evidence because "[the plaintiff's] conduct placed him in
an area of danger which should have been obvious to a reasona-
bly prudent observer.""1 ' The case is now on appeal.132 Although
the jury found the City of New York to be only 5% at fault, if
the award is upheld on appeal, under the theory of joint and
several liability, the City will end up paying the majority. 33
An even more shocking example of how joint and several
liability can work against a municipality is the case of Cordero v.
City of New York 34 in which the driver of a car struck the pillar
of an elevated subway, injuring several passengers in the car. 35
The jury found that the defendant driver was intoxicated at the
time of the incident, and was 99% at fault. 36 The jury returned
a verdict for the plaintiff, passenger D. Cordero, in the sum of
$1,000,000.1'7 Despite the fact that the jury found the City of
New York to be only 1% at fault, under joint and several liabil-
ity, the City must pay whatever amount the driver is unable to
pay. 38 In this case, it might be the entire $1,000,000.'1,
Recently, in Bailey v. Honda Motor Co., 4 0 the plaintiff
brought an action for personal injuries arising out of the colli-
sion of a Honda motor bike, owned and operated by defendant
Albertini, with a car owned and operated by defendant,
Smeaton."'I The street on which the accident occurred had re-
131. Id. at 2 (quoting Terry v. State, 79 A.D.2d 1069, 1069, 435 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390
(3d Dep't 1981)).
132. Borenstein interview, supra note 102.
133. Id.
134. Cordero v. City of New York, 112 A.D.2d 914, 492 N.Y.S.2d 430 (2d Dep't
1985).
135. Id. at 915, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
136. Id. at 916, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 432; Borenstein interview, supra note 102.
137. Cordero, 112 A.D.2d at 914, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 431.
138. Borenstein interview, supra note 102.
139. Id. If, however, comparative negligence theory was applied, the City would only
have to pay its proportionate share, or $10,000. According to Eugene Borenstein, when
the jury found out that the City would probably end up paying the whole amount, they
wanted to go back to the judge to inform him that their intention was for the City to pay
Cordero only $10,000 and not $1,000,000. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 33-
38 for a discussion of comparative negligence.
140. No. 81-2253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1987), aff'd, No. 55633 (N.Y.
App. Div. 3d Dep't Oct. 20, 1988) (WESTLAW, States library, New York file).
141. Id.; Plaintiff's Pretrial Memorandum at 1, Bailey v. Honda Motor Co., No. 81-
2253, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1987), aff'd, No. 55633 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d
Dep't Oct. 20, 1988) (WESTLAW, States library, New York file) (available from
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cently been repaved for the City of Schenectady by another de-
fendant, Paving Contractors, Inc. who, five weeks after repaving,
had not yet repainted the center dividing line.142 The City was
held to be 5% at fault for failing to restripe the road after resur-
facing. 143 The remaining defendants who were 95% at fault,
however, did not have enough insurance coverage to satisfy their
part of the judgment.1 4 ' As a result, although the City was only
5% at fault, it will probably end up paying the bulk of the
judgment. 145
IV. Legislative Response
A. Recommendations of the Jones Commission
Based on its findings regarding the perils of joint and sev-
eral liability for deep-pocket defendants, the Jones Commission
made recommendations for both the elimination of joint and
several liability 140 and the imposition of monetary caps on pain
and suffering awards.1 47 Although the Governor made it clear at
the inception of the Jones Commission that he was vehemently
opposed to caps, 48 the Commission still proposed the following:
"except for intentional torts and actions for wrongful death, in
any personal injury action against a public entity defendant, a
plaintiff's compensation for non-economic damages 4' should
be statutorily limited to $250,000, adjusted annually for infla-
tion."' 60
DeGraff, Foy, Conway, Holt-Harris & Mealey, attorneys for plaintiffs, Albany, N.Y.).
142. Plaintiff's Pretrial Memorandum at 2, Bailey v. Honda Motor Co., No. 81-2253
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1987), aff'd, No. 55633 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't Oct.
20, 1988) (WESTLAW, States library, New York file).
143. Telephone interview with John DeGraff, DeGraff, Foy, Conway, Holt-Harris &
Mealey (Feb. 16, 1988).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 132-33.
147. Id. at 149.
148. Interview with Wayne B. Cotter, Director of Research & Statistics, New York
State Insurance Department, in New York City (Nov. 25, 1987).
149. Noneconomic damages are pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and severe
emotional distress. Economic damages are any monetary loss that the plaintiff can show
resulted from plaintiff's injuries. Examples of economic damages include lost wages (both
past and future) and medical bills (past and future). D. SIGEL, supra note 22, at 61
(Supp. 1987).
150. JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 149.
1989]
23
PACE LAW REVIEW
In arriving at its recommendations, the Commission consid-
ered proposals by various lobby groups. The State Conference of
Mayors, proposed not only the elimination of joint and several
liability, but also a threshold $2,500 minimum medical expense
in order to qualify for recovery for any noneconomic losses, a
cap of $150,000 on individual awards, and a $450,000 cap with
respect to each occurrence."5 '
Countering this proposal, the Alliance for Consumer Rights,
the Trial Lawyers Association, and Ralph Nader lobbied against
the imposition of caps. These organizations argued that caps put
artificial and arbitrary limits on a plaintiff's right to a monetary
recovery.152 They found that seriously injured victims with se-
vere lifelong disabilities, would recover no more than a less seri-
ously injured plaintiff who is given the maximum award allowed
by the cap. 153 Furthermore, "It]he elderly and poor are dispro-
portionately affected by a cap [because] .. .[t]hese . . .people
...would sustain little 'economic damage,' and depend mostly
on 'non-economic damages' for compensation.' 154
The constitutionality of caps has been the subject of debate
nationwide. 5 Some states have already declared such caps un-
constitutional.'56 Others, however, have gone the route of impos-
ing monetary 'caps in an effort to bring down the costs of
liability.15 7
151. Hearings, supra note 3, at Appendix.
152. ALLIANCE, supra note 67, at 5; BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 75, at 12, 14.
153. BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 75, at 14.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986). In this Virginia
case, a jury returned a verdict in excess of the state's statutory cap on damages. Id. at
784-85. The judge upheld the verdict and refused to reduce the award to coincide with
the statutory limits. Id. at 796.
156. Id. at 785 n.2. The following courts have declared limitations of recovery on
damages unconstitutional: Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984),
writ of error revoked, 714 S.W.2d 310 (1986); White v. State, 203 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d
1272 (1983); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Jones v. State Bd. of
Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977) on re-
mand, Nos. 55527 & 55586 (4th D. Idaho Nov. 3, 1980) (damages held unconstitutional);
Arneson v. Olson, 270 NW.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Simon v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center,
Inc., 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (C.P. Montgomery 1976); Wright v. Central
DuPage Hosp., 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
157. Thirty-five states have some kind of monetary ceiling on damages. JONES
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 138-39. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 9.17.010 (Supp. 1986);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5 (1986); 1986 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 86-160 (West); 1986
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The Jones Commission justified its proposal for monetary
caps, stating: "[p]ublic entities must constantly balance compet-
ing needs against scarce resources. ' 158 The Jones Commission
also cited to the Court of Appeals' opinion in O'Connor v. City
of New York 1 59 that stated public policy should not "impede
municipal officials from allocating resources where they would
most benefit the public, by making the prime concern the avoid-
ance of tort liability rather than the promotion of the public
welfare."160
Despite the Jones Commission recommendation for caps,
however, Governor Cuomo in conjunction with the State Assem-
bly leadership, forced caps to be cut from the proposed legisla-
tion. 61 The focus then turned to the problem of holding one de-
fendant responsible for an entire judgment, regardless of the
proportionate shares of fault.16 2 As a result, modification of the
joint and several liability rule in New York, through the passage
of Article 16, became the Legislature's solution to the insurance
liability crisis.
B. The Scope of Article 16
Article 16 limits liability for a defendant who is 50% or less
at fault to his proportionate share; in other words, he is only
held severally liable.16 The statute's application is limited to
noneconomic losses such as pain and suffering, loss of consor-
Haw. Sess. Laws Act 2; 1986 Ill. Laws 84-1431; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 44.070(l),(5)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8202(1) (1988); 1986 Mass.
Acts 351 § 26 (604); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.031 (1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14
(1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154A (West 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-15-16 (1986);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120 (Law. Co-op. 1987); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
101.023 (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-227 (1986); 1986 Wash. Laws 305 § 301 (2);
W.VA. CODE § 29-12A-7 (1988); 1985-87 Wis. Laws 340. Pennsylvania has established
monetary ceilings on damages in case law. See Loeffler v. Mountaintop Area Joint Sani-
tary, 101 Pa. Commw. 514, 516 A.2d 848 (1986).
158. JONES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 144.
159. 58 N.Y.2d 184, 447 N.E.2d 33, 460 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1983).
160. Id. at 191, 447 N.E.2d at 36, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
161. ALLIANCE, supra note 67, at 3.
162. Id.
163. " 'Severally liable' means that each defendant will be liable only for the share of
an award that corresponds to his/her adjudged percentage share of fault." JONES COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 1, at 133 n.1. But see supra note 10 and supra text accompanying
notes 121-124.
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tium, and mental anguish.""
The statute requires due diligence in joining all defendants
within the court's jurisdiction. 165 Tortfeasors who are within the
jurisdiction of the court may have their share of fault adjudi-
cated, whether a party to the action or not." If it is proven that
there is no jurisdiction over a tortfeasor, his absence from the
action will not prejudice the plaintiff because that tortfeasor's
percentage of liability is not considered in computing payment
of the judgment.16 7
The statute will apply to municipal vehicle accidents which
involve a police or fire vehicle; however, under the motor vehicle
exception, Article 16 will not apply to those accidents involving
other municipal vehicles, road conditions, or traffic signs. 6"
While Article 16 made sweeping changes in tort law, its applica-
tion is greatly limited by this and numerous other exceptions.
Other exceptions include cases involving intentional torts,
reckless disregard, products liability, and nondelegable duties.6 9
Many of the exceptions reflect the efforts of special interest
groups.170 The Environmental Planning Lobby (EPL) was in-
strumental in creating the exemption for unlawful releases of
hazardous substances,1 7 1 while the AFL-CIO lobbied successfully
for a workers' compensation exemption from the joint and sev-
eral modification.17 2 Under this exception, where plaintiff's em-
ployer is impleaded, both the employer and the primary defend-
164. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 1601 (McKinney Supp. 1988). Indemnification and
contribution rights have not been affected by Article 16. Id. § 1602(1), (2)(ii). Indemnifi-
cation and contribution, however, were affected by a companion bill, S.9351-A, which
abolished the collateral source rule. Previously, under the collateral source rule, wrong-
doers were not able to take advantage of any collateral source of money due the victim in
order to offset the judgment, for example, money from the victim's own insurance com-
pany. The elimination of this rule causes the victim's award to be reduced by this
amount, and result in an unearned windfall for the defendant's carrier.
165. Id. § 1601(1).
166. Id. See also D. Siegel, The New Law Partially Abolishing the Joint Liability
Rule in Tort Cases - Part I, N.Y. ST. L. DIG., Oct. 1986, at 2.
167. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 1601(1) (McKinney Supp. 1988); see also D. Siegel,
The New Law Partially Abolishing the Joint Liability Rule in Tort Cases - Part II, N.Y.
ST. L. DIG., Oct. 1986, at 2.
168. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 1602(6) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
169. Id. § 1602.
170. ALLIANCE, supra note 67, at 6-8.
171. Id. at 7.
172. Id. at 8.
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ant can still be held jointly and severally liable. 1"
Unfortunately, many of the exceptions to Article 16 have
taken the bite out of the statute. The application of Article 16,
for example, is precluded in any situation involving a nondelega-
ble duty.17 The case of Bailey v. Honda Motor Co.,' 7 5 where the
city was found to be only 5% at fault,'"6 illustrates the applica-
tion of the nondelegable duty exception. In Bailey, the fact that
the private contractor was hired to restripe the road and ne-
glected to do so for five weeks'" becomes irrelevant with respect
to the city's responsibility, since responsibility for road condi-
tion is a nondelegable duty.' 8 Therefore, even after the enact-
ment of Article 16, the city would still be held jointly and sever-
ally liable for its 5% of fault. Thus, the pre-Article 16 outcome
is the same as the post-Article 16 outcome.
The question that must ultimately be answered is: Will Ar-
ticle 16, with its many exceptions, be of any help in addressing
the problems of the insurance liability crisis?'7 9 Commentators
have speculated that because these exceptions greatly limit the
impact of Article 16, many will eventually be eliminated after
the legal community and consumer groups have had sufficient
time to swallow the bitter pill of tort reform. 8 '
V. Did Article 16 Get to the Root of the Problem?
The Jones Commission identified such factors as higher jury
awards, increased litigation, the elimination of contributory neg-
ligence, poor business practices on the part of the insurance in-
173. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 1602(4) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
174. Id. § 1602(2)(iv). Delegation is defined by Prosser as "the appointment by the
obligor of another to render performance on his behalf." W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at
662.
175. No. 81-2253, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1987), aff'd, No. 55633 (N.Y.
App. Div. 3d Dep't Oct. 20, 1988) (WESTLAW, States library, New York file). For the
facts of Bailey, see supra text accompanying notes 140-145.
176. Bailey, No. 81-2253, aff'd, No. 55633 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't Oct. 20, 1988)
(WESTLAW, States library, New York file).
177. Bailey, No. 55633, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't Oct. 20, 1988)
(WESTLAW, States library, New York file).
178. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R. § 1602(2)(iv) (McKinney Supp. 1988); D. Siegel, The
New Law Partially Abolishing the Joint Liability Rule in Tort Cases - Part II, N.Y. ST.
L. DIG., Nov. 1986, at 3.
179. Conway interview, supra note 104.
180. Id.
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dustry, and the imposition of joint and several liability as having
caused the insurance liability crisis.'81 Many consumer groups
and people in the legal profession disagreed with the first three
of these five factors.' The latter two were addressed by the leg-
islature in Article 16 and new insurance industry regulations. 83
Nevertheless, it is a mistake to believe that the problems of the
insurance liability crisis have been remedied now that Article 16
has significantly changed some of the principles of joint and sev-
eral liability, and new regulations are in place to address the
problems of poor industry business practices. 84 On the contrary,
joint and several liability and poor industry business practices
lie only at the surface of the insurance problem. The core of the
problem is found by examining the recent developments in tort
law which have broadened the scope of tortfeasors' liability,
thus, exposing them to greater liability than ever before.
A. The Real Villain - The Impact of Dole
The landmark New York case of Dole v. Dow Chemical
Co.1' 5 singlehandedly removed many of the obstacles and disin-
centives to joining third parties; first, by eliminating the active-
passive distinction among tortfeasors, 86 and later, through the
establishment of comparative negligence and the mechanics for
apportioning damages between all parties in a single action. 87
The immediate consequence of this radical departure from a
longstanding principle (the distinction between active and pas-
sive tortfeasors), and the creation of a process for apportionment
181. See supra text accompanying notes 66-145.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 66-145.
183. See supra note 9 and N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 162 (1987).
184. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 162 (1987).
185. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). See also supra text
accompanying note 26 discussing the facts of Dole.
186. Dole, 30 N.Y.2d at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 291-92, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387; D.
SIEGEL, supra note 22, at 211. See also supra text accompanying notes 23-30.
187. 30 N.Y.2d at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 291-92, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387; D. SIEGEL,
supra note 22, at 211. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
The conclusion reached is that where a third party is found to have been respon-
sible for a part, but not all, of the negligence for which a defendant is cast in
damages, the responsibility for that part is recoverable by the prime defendant
against the third party. To reach that end there must necessarily be an apportion-
ment of responsibility in negligence between those parties.
Dole, 30 N.Y.2d at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
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of damages, was a veritable avalanche of third-party litigation.1 18
The theory behind the decision in Dole was to join all par-
ties in one action to reduce redundant and repeated litigation of
essentially the same issues in a later suit for contribution among
defendants. 189 While Dole may have succeeded in achieving that
goal, it created other problems. The increase in third-party liti-
gation which resulted, brought with it an attendant increase in
the cost of defending and litigating such complex matters. In
other words, the real villain appears to be the inevitable fallout
of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.' 90
B. Litigation Costs are Increased by Post-Dole Surge in
Third-Party Litigation
For the purposes of this discussion, it is essential to distin-
guish between primary litigation (victim v. active tortfeasor),
and third-party litigation (primary defendant v. alleged third-
party passive or active defendants). While the number of pri-
mary actions in New York has remained relatively constant,'9
there has been an exponential increase in the number of third-
party actions instituted. 92
Before the emergence of Dole, the bulk of cases tried in-
volved merely a single plaintiff and a defendant. 93 After Dole, a
flood of third-party litigation ensued from the newly found abil-
ity of a defendant in the primary action to sue over against a
plaintiff's employer, or any other passive tortfeasor involved. 9"'
The defendant's desire to secure some level of contribution from
each party involved was a strong incentive to implead as many
third parties as could be found.'95 Now, it is not uncommon for a
case to involve a multitude of parties brought in through cross-
claims, impleader, and counterclaims. Consequently, there was a
188. Conway interview, supra note 104.
189. Id.
190. Dole, 30 N.Y.2d at 143, 282 N.E.2d at 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 382. Dole's statu-
tory counterparts in other states would account for the nationwide insurance liability
crisis. See Gordon & Crowley, supra note 33, at 458.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
192. Conway interview, supra note 104.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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corresponding increase in the cost of litigating actions involving
numerous third parties.19 Because each party's interests may
conflict with the others', cases necessarily involve a multitude of
attorneys, as well. It is not surprising that this multitude of par-
ties and attorneys would multiply the costs of litigation. Accord-
ing to Mr. Bonaros, Vice-President and General Counsel of
Utica Mutual, as "litigation has become increasingly complex...
the cost of defending law suits has increased accordingly. 1 97
In 1962, the New York State Legislature adopted extensive
provisions in Article 31 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules for
disclosure, discovery, and inspection in the prosecution of all ac-
tions.19 8 Under those rules, each party is entitled to conduct its
own discovery upon each of the other parties.1 99 Since the enact-
ment of Article 31, and especially since the increase in third-
party actions, there has been an extraordinary proliferation of
demands, motions, and proceedings to enforce them. 00 The rea-
son for the dramatic increase is that Article 31 not only permits
demands by the plaintiff and defendant in the primary action,
but also permits demands for disclosure, discovery, and inspec-
tion among each of the parties in each of the third-party ac-
tions.201 As third-party motion practice involving demands and
proceedings to enforce demands has become commonplace, the
level of proceedings and consequent labor has increased in an
exponential manner. 202 This has led to a corresponding increase
in the cost of litigation. Since it is often the insurance companies
who are defending these suits (in addition to paying the judg-
ments) they would be directly and substantially affected by in-
creased litigation costs. The Jones Commission never addressed
this obvious and highly significant development, which occurred
196. Id.
197. Hearings, supra note 3, at 87 (statement of Thomas Bonaros, Vice-President
and General Counsel, Utica Mutual). According to Judge Conway, "[tihe cost of litiga-
tion has, of course, gone up with the increase in numbers of parties." Conway interview,
supra note 104.
198. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 3101-3140 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1989).
199. Id.
200. Conway interview, supra note 104.
201. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 3101(a) and commentary at 17-18 (McKinney 1970 &
Supp. 1989).
202. Conway interview, supra note 104.
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following the decision in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.2 03
Despite the disadvantages of complexity and cost of mul-
tiparty litigation, the advantage is that all parties involved are
present at one time, thereby providing a more complete picture
of the evidence, facts, and issues to the jury. While the method-
ology of apportioning verdicts between multiple defendants
must inevitably result in some difficulty for jurors, it appears to
be the only fair way to ensure that each party is held responsible
only to the extent of his involvement or level of wrongdoing.
Thus, third-party actions are here to stay, especially in light of
the Article 16 limits on joint and several liability. By holding the
defendant who is 50% or less at fault only to his proportionate
share, there now is an even greater incentive for him to join as
many co-defendants as possible, thereby reducing his own share
of fault.
C. Are Our Insurance Problems Over?
Premiums have decreased somewhat since 1985 as a result
of the investment cycle of the insurance industry. No cases,
however, have come to trial thus far under Article 16. Therefore,
the results of the New York State Legislature's attempt to res-
cue the deep-pocket defendant from the perils of low-fault/high-
paying judgments through modification of joint and several lia-
bility have yet to be seen.
The obvious question that remains is whether Article 16 will
bring an end to the problems of insurance availability and af-
fordability which have plagued both insurance consumer and in-
surer. Since municipalities, as deep-pocket defendants, were
often made to bear a disproportionate amount of the burden of a
judgment,04 the limits now imposed on joint and several liabil-
ity should reduce the amount insurance carriers pay out in judg-
ments against municipalities. This in turn should reduce munici-
pal premiums. However, Article 16's effect may be diminished to
the extent that factors other than joint and several liability -
such as the increase in third-party actions - have contributed
to the crisis.
203. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 125-145.
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Dole made sweeping changes in tort law with respect to ac-
tive/passive negligence, contributory negligence, and compara-
tive negligence. These changes, in conjunction with the theory of
joint and several liability, leave few limitations on who may be
brought into an action by the plaintiff or the defendant, and
even fewer limitations on how much of the judgment they may
ultimately be required to pay.20 5 The post-Dole student and
practitioner are familiar with the mind-boggling results, i.e.
third-party defendants, third-party plaintiffs, fourth-party de-
fendants, fourth-party plaintiffs, and so on. This proliferation of
parties was almost unheard of in the days of pre-Dole restric-
tions206 barring impleader by an active defendant of a co-
tortfeasor, and maintenance of suits where the plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent. 07 Once Dole lifted these restrictions, the
floodgates were opened - not to an increase in the numbers of
plaintiffs bringing primary actions, but rather to the avalanche
of third-party actions that ensued.20 To the extent that this
proliferation of third-party claims has increased the costs of liti-
gation and thus underwriting expenses, Article 16 will not effect
a change.
Suggestions have been made for additional changes in mu-
nicipal liability coverage to further reduce the likelihood of dra-
matic across-the-board premium hikes. For small municipalities
and villages, whose premiums rose dramatically in 1985 regard-
less of their claims record, Thomas Goddard, of the Alliance for
Consumer Rights, has suggested that insurance premiums work
as the automobile liability system works - according to past
performance.2 9 Under this system, a city's liability premium
would be calculated based on the amount and number of past
205. See supra text accompanying notes 25-54 and 121-145.
206. Conway interview, supra note 104.
207. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 23-38.
208. Conway interview, supra note 103. See also supra text accompanying notes 185-
195.
209. Testimony of Thomas G. Goddard, Director, Alliance for Consumer Rights,
before the Governor's Special Comm'n on Liab. Ins. 20 (Feb. 19, 1986) [hereinafter God-
dard testimony] (copies of testimony available from Alliance for Consumer Rights, 321
Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10007). Since insurance industry practices have contributed
to the insurance crisis, consideration should be given to solutions which address these
practices, such as the creation of risk retention programs. Kindregan & Swartz, supra
note 80, at 711.
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liability claims against it.210 Thus, if a city has a particularly bad
claims record for road safety, that record would be reflected in
the amount of its premium. This system would achieve two
things. First, the cost of insuring cities with bad claims records
would not be passed along to cities with good claims records.
Second, the system would serve as an incentive program, encour-
aging cities to step up public safety in exchange for the rewards
of lower premiums. This system has worked for automobile in-
surance.21 There is no reason why it would not work for munici-
pal liability.
Still another approach to reducing deep-pocket liability
would be to raise the minimum amount of statutorily prescribed
liability insurance that must be carried by all resident motorists
in the State. Currently, the minimum is only $10,000.212 There-
fore, when judgments exceed that amount and the defendant
cannot pay, a financially responsible defendant is more likely to
be forced to pay a disproportionate share of the costs.
A $10,000 minimum auto insurance coverage, 213 burdensome
costs of litigating a multitude of third-party actions," and pre-
mium rates which are set without regard to an insured's claim
record,21 5 still stand today as obstacles to reduced insurance pre-
miums. Nonetheless, Article 16 has made significant progress to-
ward reducing deep-pocket liability. Moreover, Article 16 strikes
a fair balance between a plaintiff's right to recover and a munici-
pality's obligation to protect its constituents from uninsured or
underinsured losses.
VI. Conclusion
Inherent in our tort system is the concept that wrongdoers
should pay for their wrongdoing, and that those harmed should
be justly compensated. 21' Any attempt at tort reform, therefore,
210. Despite the fact that the Capital District Transit Authority had no claims filed
against its umbrella policy, the premium jumped 288% in one year. JONES COMM'N RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 33.
211. Goddard testimony, supra note 209, at 20.
212. Id. at 22.
213. Id.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 195-202.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 211-213.
216. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 7.
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must be undertaken with veneration for these common-law prin-
ciples of justice. Rather than seeking the total elimination of the
plaintiff's rights to a full recovery with one stroke of the legisla-
tive pen, reform should begin with smaller steps which leave so-
ciety in a position to assess results and to plan subsequent
moves accordingly.
Ultimately, any tort reform should strike a balance between
honoring the plaintiff's right to compensation and protecting the
public fisc. While Article 16 does not completely address the
post-Dole proliferation of third-party litigation, it does strike
such a balance. Article 16 protects the deep-pocket defendant
from paying a grossly disproportionate share of the jury award,
and in so doing it offers such defendants substantial relief. At
the same time, Article 16 leaves the plaintiff a degree of protec-
tion, in that joint and several liability is to some extent retained.
Dole has had an overwhelming effect in contributing to the
costs of litigation, and in its wake, would-be reformers should
not be lulled into mistaken reliance on industry's oft-cited
claims of ever increasing jury awards and increasing litigiousness
of our society to justify proposals for curtailing plaintiff's rights.
The real villain in the insurance liability crisis is Dole, and in
that sense, Article 16 while only a partial remedy, is nonetheless
a saving grace.
Gail Huberty Glance
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